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MENOAAH 
REVIEW· THE JUDAIC STUDIES PROGRAM OF VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY· NUMBER 4 ·SUMMER 1985 
SYMPOSIUM 
This symposium is a response to 
the Review essay of Sarah Gor­
don's Hitler, Germany, and the 
"Jewish Question," written by jo­
seph W. Bendersky, which ap­
peared in the spring 1985 issue of 
Menorah Review. -f.S.. 
Alice L. Eckardt 
joseph Bendersky is correct in 
mentioning the uneasiness Sarah 
Gordon's book elicits. 
Gordon provides a full analysis of 
Hitler's ethnic theory, interpretation 
of world history, and conviction of 
having a "holy mission" that only he 
had the fortitude to accomplish. But 
she does not consider sufficiently the 
way in which his "messianism" was 
accepted by so many who allowed 
him to become their conscience, nor 
how his elite 55 came to believe in 
their godlike impunity in determin­
ing life and death for millions. 
The fact that before Kristal/nacht 
"probably a majority of Germans" 
found Nazi racial policies acceptable 
demonstrates how radical evil builds 
on lesser evil, or even on what some 
see as positive. Here the culpability 
of Christianity cannot be evaded. The 
church's centuries-old insistence that 
jews must remain outsiders in a 
Christian society, tolerated only with 
limited rights and controlled by law, 
continued into the 1940s. The need to 
protect the faithful from unfaithful 
jewry was added to a theology of 
divine punishment. Anti-Semites 
even of an anti-Christian type could 
use church laws and teachings for 
their own more radical ends and thus 
undermine Christian opposition. Al­
though the chapter on the churches 
is one of the weaker ones, two of 
Gordon's more telling statements 
should be underlined: "The failure of 
German churches to speak out 
against racial persecution is a dis­
grace second only to that of the mili­
tary. . . [Why not greater than the 
military?] For the 'nonconverted' 
Jews in Germany, both churches may 
as well have been nonexistent as 
institutions" (pp. 261-62). 
The evidence that only a small mi­
nority of Germans and even Nazis 
were rabid anti-Semites points to tpe 
need for early opposition to any dis­
criminatory acts or ideology. The 
small number could accomplish their 
devastation because tens of thou­
sands of Germans facilitated exclu­
sion, deportation, and murder just 
by doing their jobs as usual, or by 
being a bit more zealous in order to 
earn a promotion; because millions 
aided the killers by remaining "neu­
tral"; and because thousands of rabid 
anti-Semites of other nations enthusi­
astically joined the "war against the 
jews." 
The behavior of so many Germans 
is frighteningly understandable. Peo­
ple are primarily concerned for them­
selves and their families, indifferent 
to those unknown or unseen, desir­
ous of blocking out unpleasant facts, 
and tempted to adjust their moral 
standards to those of the majority or 
the powerful. We know, too, how 
totalitarian states rely on networks of 
secret police and informants, oppor­
tunists and amoral careerists, arbi­
trary arrests, torture, and execution 
to terrorize populations into submis­
sion. We realize that Hitler's piece­
meal strategy and gradualist escala­
tion were essential for the Final 
Solution; he could not have initiated 
it in 1933. We recognize the clever 
way in which Hitler made so many 
into criminal accomplices. We won­
der what we would have done in 
these circumstances, and we become, 
reluctantly, empathetic. 
Yet we are troubled. Is it that sim­
ple to accomplish mass murder? We 
are driven to remember the wide­
spread support of the Nazis' "moder­
ate anti-Semitic" measures. 
Our uneasiness goes deeper. For 
all the unimpeachable scholarship 
and research, something seems to be 
missing. Do the data truly reflect the 
situation? If only fear, helplessness, 
careerist opportunism, identification 
with the Fuhrer, or indifference kept 
most Germans from showing their 
opposition to persecution and mur­
der, why did they show so little sym­
pathy and, in fact, manifest such hos­
tility to jewish survivors after the 
war? 
Nor can we stop here. We also are 
forced to take another look at the 
attitudes and behavior of the English­
speaking world both during and for 
years after the end of the Third 
Reich. Anti-Semitism and callous in­
difference were not restricted to Ger­
many or Europe. 
·Alice L. Eckardt is professor of religious stud­
ies at Lehigh University. 
Henry L. Feingold 
Gordon's research can be inter­
preted as letting the German people 
off the hook as far as guilt for the 
destruction of European Jewry is 
concerned by placing that guilt more 
squarely on Hitler. But, in fact, her 
findings are far more complex than 
that. 
Gordon's book is, as Bendersky 
suggests, not really such a great de­
parture from the general direction of 
current historiography on the nature 
of anti-Semitism during the war. 
(See, for example, Michael M. 
Marrus, "The Theory and Practice of 
Anti-Semitism," Commentary, August 
1982, and Milton Himmelfarb, "No 
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Hitler-No Holocaust," Commentary, 
March 1984. Both essays go well be­
yond the normative demonic portrait 
of German anti-Semitism during the 
war.) When historians get down to 
the particulars, the satanic anti-Se­
mitic gestalt becomes fragmented 
and merges into the background of 
the historical canvas; it does not van­
ish, but bureaucracies, fanatic minor­
ities intent on genocide, indifference 
of other power holders such as the 
officer corps, and of course the enig­
matic figure of Hitler himself become 
far more important. It is difficult for 
historians to find the link between 
pre-war, normative anti-Semitism 
and the Final Solution. It may sound 
amazing, but Nazism did give nor­
mative anti-Semitism a bad name and 
also somehow went beyond it. 
I don't mean to suggest that the 
Final Solution was implemented in a 
fit of absentmindedness, but the road 
to Auschwitz was a "crooked" one as 
Schleunes suggested years ago, and 
it was also one conceived of by a 
comparatively small minority who 
were abetted by a great mass of peo­
ple morally inured from its horrors. 
They neither cared nor had the cour­
age to resist what was being done in 
their names. It is not totally true to 
say that Hitler's pathology about 
Jews was amplified by power and 
was imposed by a totalitarian conduit 
on a people made powerless and 
ready by its history and its condition 
to receive and act upon the message 
emanating from government. But it 
comes close. 
What Gordon really points out is 
crucial to the struggle against anti­
Semitism here. For years we have 
nervously been taking the pulse for 
signs of anti-Semitism. But what we 
measure is latent attitudinal anti­
Semitism. Had we had such polls 
during Weimar, we probably would 
have discovered that the Germans' 
distaste for Jews was less than that of 
the French. The operative factor, 
however, is not anti-Semitic attitudes 
but who holds power. Power can offi­
cialize the "jewish question"; in Ger­
many it made the latent overt. Huge 
sections of the undifferentiated mid­
dle classes (mittelstand), realizing that 
there was profit, psychic income, and 
even status in being anti-Semitic, 
promptly became so. Or at least be­
came so enough to abandon their 
Jewish friends, spouses, connec-
tions--lest they be hurt. Power is the 
central ingredient in converting la­
tent attitudes into overt anti-Semi­
tism. That was true in Tsarist Russia, 
is true in the Soviet Union, and was 
true in Nazi Germany. It could not 
have been any vulnerable minority 
but only one that fitted the need. 
The importance of having power in 
officializing anti-Semitism can be 
gleaned from what happened in Ger­
many after Hitler perished in his 
bunker. Not only did all the symbols 
of power vanish suddenly (as if the 
Nazis had never played on the his­
torical stage), but the centerpiece of 
their mock ideology, anti-Semitism, 
went back into the closet. It became 
latent, almost impossible to detect 
among the German people. It had 
lost its heksher, its imprimatur of ac­
ceptability. When that happens, the 
faceless citizenry abandons the old 
animus and waits to hear what the 
new "in" thing will be. That is what 
mass society is all about. 
I think Gordon really tells us that 
and much more. 
Henry L. Feingold is professor of history at 
Baruch College of the City University of New 
York. 
Albert H. Friedlander 
Dr. Bendersky's review is a sober, 
responsible exposition of Sarah Gor­
don's work, which in turn is a com­
petent work of research. Much of her 
thinking is the standard approach in 
contemporary European scholarship, 
even if there are individual points 
where other conclusions may recom­
mend themselves. The response to 
this work may, therefore, suggest a 
different agenda: it is not the sound­
ness of the structure, but the use to 
which it will be put that governs the 
response. 
Can her work be used by revi­
sionist historians or by apologists for 
the Hitler regime to deny the utter 
evil of that time? Yet Bendersky re­
minds us that this work attacks the 
mythology of a Hitler ignorant of the 
mass murders, and that it destroys 
the myth of an all-powerful German 
Jewry in control of Weimar Germany. 
Bendersky also attacks the myth that 
all Germans hated the jews, that Ger-
man anti-Semitism occupied a central 
role within that society; and he 
quotes Peter Gay's comment that 
"Germans seemed less susceptible 
than Russians or even Frenchmen." 
Viewing the high level of anti-Semi­
tism in contemporary France (unoffi­
cial) and in the USSR (official) com­
pared with Germany today, this is a 
disquieting insight. 
It is vital to the understanding of 
the shoah to recognize that German 
actions were not based upon a uni­
versally accepted stereotype of all 
Jews as devils, just as contemporary 
approaches must not see all Germans 
as evil. It is only then that we begin 
to perceive the other factors that Jed 
to the mass destruction of minority 
groups within the Third Reich: the 
attitude of unquestioning obedience 
to authority; the growing attack upon 
all religious patterns (Salo Baron: "It 
is unmistakable how the resistance 
against everything that Judaism and 
Christianity stand for has increased 
since the seventies of the nineteenth 
century, and it is no exaggeration to 
say that this development prepared 
the ground for the Nazi assumption 
of power"-in Deutsche und ]uden, 
Frankfurt, 1967); the role of the 
church and of Christian teaching, 
even though Christianity itself was 
attacked; a political pattern in which 
Left and Right both destroyed the 
Weimar Republic even when fighting 
each other; and various other factors 
existing in the economic and social 
areas of the early twentieth century. 
The shoah was and remains unique: 
a whole state turned criminal, a 
country submissive to a rule of evil. 
There is still so much to explore here, 
particularly the role of religion; and 
Sarah Gordon reminds us that 
"church-goers had a greater tend­
ency towards anti-Semitism than 
those who were no longer regular 
attendants." Here is an issue to be 
explored in greater depth, rather 
than being accepted as a polemical 
point. One of the foremost young 
theologians in Germany writes 
Christians before the time of Hitler 
cannot be accused of having desired 
the devilish acts put into practice by 
the Nazis. On the other hand, the 
Church and its theologies, through 
the centuries encouraged atti­
tudes against the Jews of hate; of 
contempt which often had 
deadly results ... to the christologi­
cally founded denial of Israel's right 
to exist, that is, denying the jewish 
people's being the people of God, 
walking the path of life with the 
Torah. 
Peter von der Osten-Sacken, 
Grundzuege einer Theologie im 
christlich-juedischen Gespraech, 
Munich, 1982, pp. 29ff 
There is a dimension of theology 
here, which current historiography 
has not assessed sufficiently. Thus, it 
is an over-simplification to view 
Luther's invective, as used by Strei­
cher and the Stuermer, as a major 
aspect of anti-Jewish policies. Rather, 
it is a doctrine of exclusion from grace 
and a concordat with the state to 
whom Luther hands the Jews for 
punishment that created a relation­
ship between church and state facili­
tating a criminal state's work of geno­
cide. Apathy and lack of resistance 
were linked to that fatal relationship. 
The Confessing Church of Bonhoef­
fer, and the very real resistance 
within Germany, which scholarship 
has now disclosed, were minor as­
pects of swimming against the 
stream. Yet they may not be ignored. 
There is a tendency within contem­
porary historiography of the shoah to 
do just that. Bendersky's review, 
linked to Gordon's book, is a sound 
attempt to show the larger picture, 
and it should be welcomed for that 
reason by those who may disagree 
with some of the analyses given in 
such a presentation. 
Albert H. Friedlander is director of Leo Baeck 
College, London. 
Herbert Hirsch 
The debate over whether the Holo­
caust was the result of a single indi­
vidual's ability to gain power and 
implement his program of destruc­
tion or was tied to threads running 
through German culture and history 
is replayed once again in Bendersky' s 
review essay. In reviewing Sarah 
Gordon's Hitler, Germany, and the 
"Jewish Question," Bendersky dis­
plays his own peculiar vision of 
history. 
Bendersky sets up a "straw man," 
which he proceeds to discredit. His 
repetitive use of phrases such as 
"uniformly anti-Semitic," "total fail-
ures," "uniform attitude," and "inev­
itable result" creates the impression 
that history can be analyzed in such a 
fashion as to provide analyses that 
allow one to make universalistic 
judgments. By resorting to such ter­
minology, Bendersky creates a situa­
tion that allows him to easily dis­
credit the analysis. If, for example, 
the opponent is said to have stated 
that Germans were "uniformly anti­
Semitic," then all one needs to refute 
that is to find the single exception to 
that rule. Life does not, of course, 
operate in such simplistic fashion, 
and historical events do not proceed 
in this manner. No creditable scholar 
would, in fact, argue that Germans 
were "uniformly anti-Semitic." 
As life is ambiguous, there are am­
biguities and inconsistencies in all 
nation states and cultures. Genocide, 
as other actions initiated by the state, 
does not result from some single act 
or individual. Policy is the result of 
historical processes. States do not, sui 
generis, suddenly decide to engage in 
policy such as genocide, and geno­
cide does not suddenly appear in a 
cloud of smoke emerging from the 
fevered imagination of a single indi­
vidual. Just as there were historical 
reasons and precedents leading to 
the genocide against the native 
Americans and Khmers, so too were 
there historical precedents in Ger­
many. When he refused to recognize 
this, Bendersky established his own 
brand of historical determinism, 
which implies that historical evolu­
tion is irrelevant since events seem to 
materialize from the mind of a single 
individual. 
This notion of Hitler as the soul 
architect of genocide implies that 
there was no authoritarianism or 
anti-Semitism in German culture and 
that no other support was necessary. 
No Martin Luther with his vicious 
"On the Jews and Their Lies"; no 
cultural or historic antecedents; no 
Himmler with his bizarre theories­
just Hitler. How easy it would be if 
we could follow this example and 
blame Lyndon Johnson alone for 
Vietnam or saddle Andrew Jackson 
with responsibility for the genocide 
against native Americans. History 
becomes neater and cleaner than life, 
and people below the level of Hitler 
or Johnson or Jackson are conve­
niently absolved of any responsibil­
ity. This absolution, even though one 
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hesitates to say it, comes perilously 
close to the justification given by the 
Nuremburg defendants: they were 
not responsible, they were simply 
following orders. 
Interestingly, there has in recent 
years been an increase in this type of 
analysis, which excuses horrific acts 
on the grounds that they were the 
product of the psychopathologic 
mind of a single individual. Hannah 
Arendt in her famous concept of the 
"Banality of Evil" found this type of 
interpretation to be faulty at the core. 
She argued, convincingly I think, 
that acts of ultimate evil are often 
committed by very ordinary people 
in the name of some higher goal. 
Leaders may inspire, but someone 
has to pull the triggers, release the 
gasses, and drop the bombs. Hitler 
did not do it by himself. 
Of course, as Bendersky argues, 
many Germans were apathetic. No 
doubt most people in most polities 
are most concerned about their per­
sonal interests, and no doubt many 
were afraid to oppose the Nazis. Yet, 
"millions of true believers," to use 
Bendersky's phrase, are rather a 
large number. As with any issue of 
this magnitude, if one is not part of 
the solution, that is if one does not 
oppose genocide, then one is part of 
the problem; that is by silence one 
connives with evil. Unfortunately, 
Bendersky appears to adopt a per­
spective that comes very close to ar­
guing that once events are in motion, 
nothing can be done to resist or to 
change their course. The fact is that 
resistance has been successful and 
revolutions have occurred. Ben­
dersky's view is inherently status 
quo-oriented and implies an inher­
ently negative view of human poten­
tiality. The contrary view is that peo­
ple have the ability to make their own 
history. It is a view receptive to 
change and implies a positive view of 
human potentiality. 
Whichever perspective one adopts 
is ultimately an ideological or value 
choice. Bendersky has chosen to 
view history rigidly, as the result of 
the workings of a single individual's 
mind. In doing so, he oversimplifies 
complex events and comes close to 
providing an excuse for those who 
participated in the Holocaust: it was 
not, after all, their fault; Hitler 
started the process of destruction, 
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and they simply followed orders and 
had no choice but to obey since re­
sistance was futile. 
Herbert Hirsch is professor of political science 
at VCU. 
Brigitte A. A. Kern 
What made it possible for Jews in 
capitalistic, modernizing Germany to 
become a projective screen for a dam­
aged identity that no longer came to 
grips with the complexity of society? 
Why was it necessary to use the met­
aphor of "greedy capitalist" to over­
come their own deprivations and un­
certainties? I suppose the relative 
readiness of German society before 
1933 to assimilate, the readiness of 
the German Jews to become assimi­
lated, and the obsessive-destructive 
bureaucratic annihilation of the Jews 
afterwards, which went hand-in­
hand with a massive, loyal-to-the­
state toleration of the German popu­
lation, belong to the same kind of 
problems. There were a large number 
of unsolved German problems: un­
certainty about the national question, 
·which gained a new ideological stim­
ulus from the projective internation­
alism of Jews; the basic, far-reaching 
separation of intellectuals from the 
people, whose autonomy could be 
pursued as "Jewish kinship-rela­
tions"; the religious schism of Protes­
tantism and Catholicism, which 
could find a Christian-German unity 
against the "hereditary foe, Judas"; 
and the speed of economic develop­
ment in the German Reich. Since all 
these factors could become an ideo­
logical construct in the middle of an 
economic and socio-psychological 
crisis and since Jewish values seemed 
unworthy of defense, the Holocaust 
could take its course though unno­
ticed at the outset. 
If the Germans as a group cannot 
be held responsible because they say 
that they did not know they were 
part of the machinery or because 
they were born after the Holocaust, I 
would say that this is not a matter of 
personal guilt. Rather, it is the case 
that one nation committed one of the 
most horrible crimes in history. 
Whether or not someone lived then is 
completely irrelevant. This crime be­
came a part of history-German his-
tory and Jewish history-and the 
Germans are heirs to this history. 
The claim that "they were all Nazis, 
we are all Jewish" must be forgotten. 
What remains are the underlying 
conditions that still continue today. 
What is specifically German about 
the Holocaust? In all parts of Europe 
(not to mention the United States), 
there was a deep-rooted Christian 
anti-Semitism. In different European 
countries, there were elements that 
collaborated with the Germans (Pol­
ish, Austrian, Czechoslovakian, So­
viet Russian) and took an active part 
in the destruction of the Jewish peo­
ple. But the whole idea and its orga­
nization were exclusively German. 
Thanks to Goebbel's propaganda, it 
was possible to give anxious people a 
pretext, and this pretext was used 
ideologically to condemn Jews. Peo­
ple lost their inhibitions because of 
their suffering. In the propaganda, 
people were not only asked to get rid 
of their inhibitions but also ordered 
to do so: You may kill the Jews. 
There was the "normal" German 
who was relatively uninterested in 
anything, and there was the young 
SS officer who lived in a different 
world altogether and did not under­
stand his part in the tragedy. Every­
one said: "I was only a small person, 
an unimportant part of the machin­
ery; I had no influence whatever." All 
this is typical for people who think 
hierarchically. This type of behavior, 
deeply rooted in German history, led 
to the fact that Germans killed mil­
lions of people because they were of 
a different faith or nation. This was 
the inevitable result of German his­
tory after the enlightenment. 
Brigitte A. A. Kern is professor of religion at 
Seminar fur Judaistik an der Johann Wolfgang 
Goethe-Universitat, Frankfurt, West Ger­
many. 
John K. Roth 
Soviet troops liberated Auschwitz 
on January 27, 1945. Exactly 40 years 
later, the survivor -author, Elie 
Wiesel. returned there to be inter­
viewed by ABC's Peter Jennings. 
During the broadcast, Wiesel's re­
sponse to one of Jennings' questions 
included the observation that Ausch­
witz remains a monument to indiffer­
ence. 
The Holocaust pitted many ene­
mies against the Jews. None was 
more formidable, Wiesel believes, 
than the indifference of millions of 
men and women who stood by as the 
killers killed and the victims per­
ished. Sarah Gordon's Hitler, Ger­
mans, and the "Jewish Question" con­
firms Wiesel's conviction. "The 
majority of Germans," she main­
tains, "simply did not think much 
about Jews during the period of their 
deportation and extermination." 
As Joseph Bendersky suggests, 
Gordon's position is hard to accept 
because it undermines conventional 
wisdom about why the Holocaust 
happened. If Germans as a whole did 
not welcome the Final Solution, as 
this typical outlook assumes, their 
virulent anti-Semitism at the very 
least legitimated the Nazi push to­
ward Auschwitz. Gordon demytho­
logizes the explanation that could be 
plausible if the Germans had exhib­
ited a uniformly rabid Jew-hatred. 
Although reasons for such hatred 
might elude complete comprehen­
sion, depicting Germans as murder­
ously anti-Semitic would provide the 
convenience of identifying a national 
obsession as a chief cause of the ca­
tastrophe. Granted, it might still be 
difficult to fathom how hatred could 
sustain itself while 6 million died, but 
comprehension becomes even more 
problematic when the question is, in 
Bendersky's words, "How could apa­
thy prevail while millions were being 
gassed?" 
Bendersky reviews Gordon's an­
swers. Far from publicizing the exter­
minations, Nazis censored news 
about them. Rumors, of course, did 
circulate. Eyewitnesses testified, too. 
Germans also understood that the 
Nazi media were untrustworthy. 
Nevertheless, it can be credibly as­
serted that the German populace 
lacked a widespread conviction that 
its government was committing mass 
murder. Even where full knowledge 
of the slaughter existed, that aware­
ness infrequently energized resist­
ance either among institutions such 
as the church or the military, which 
might have mounted effective oppo­
sition, or among small groups and 
individuals, who stood little chance 
of blocking Nazi power in any case. 
The human tendency to obey gov­
ernmental authority, in addition to 
the Third Reich's terror tactics, effec­
tively checked resistance. 
Bendersky concurs wit!' Gordon, 
"The Holocaust," he contends, "oc­
curred in Germany because it was 
there that fanatical Nazis like Hitler, 
obsessed with racial hatred and a 
murderous historical mission, ac­
quired dictatorial control over the 
omnipotent modern state and its 
population," Unfortunately, Ben­
dersky fails to supplement that per­
ceptive summary by underscoring 
equally two additional points that are 
needed to keep the record straight. 
First, more than once Gordon 
urges that her study is no apologia 
for Germany. On the contrary, while 
Germans "have lived basically within 
the deficient but lamentably average 
standards of civilized behavior" both 
before and after the Nazi era, she 
insists that their conduct fell far, far 
below that mark in the Third Reich. 
Although driven by Hitler, a leader 
as anti-Semitic as he was charismatic, 
it was Germany's embracing of Nazi­
fication that took the world to Ausch­
witz. German anti-Semitism figured 
mightily in that relationship. Save for 
the relatively small number who 
openly protested the Nazis' anti-jew­
ish measures--they usually paid the 
full price for their courage-people 
from every sector of German society, 
certainly including those who stood 
by, must share the responsibility for 
Auschwitz. By apportioning that re­
sponsibility equitably, Gordon lets no 
one off too easily. 
Second, as she puts German anti­
Semitism in perspective, Gordon re­
veals the Holocaust's full horror. Al­
though Bendersky alludes to it by 
quoting her conclusion at the end of 
his review, the following point needs 
to be made more forcefully: Even in 
the Nazi era, most Germans were 
normal men and women who were 
not so different from most of us. But 
if normal persons are, by definition, 
less than heroes, they are also too 
willing to permit state power to de­
fine social reality. Worse, without 
much caring, normal persons will al­
low defenseless people to be targeted 
and dispatched by the millions. Indif­
ference, the Holocaust bears witness, 
is indeed the saddest human fact of 
all. For despite Bendersky's urging to 
the contrary, indifference may even 
leave us bereft of "a definite sense of 
uneasiness." 
John K. Roth is Russell K. Pitzer Professor of 
Philosophy at Claremont McKenna College. 
Richard L. Rubenstein 
Dr. Bendersky's review essay 
raises more questions than it answers 
and, in my opinion, misses the fun­
damental issue concerning the re­
sponsibility of the German nation for 
the Holocaust and for the other pro­
grams of extermination that it perpe­
trated. 
Following Sarah Gordon, Ben­
dersky stresses the apathy of the ma­
jority of the Germans with regard to 
the fate of the jews. Like Gordon, he 
ascribes much of that apathy to the 
fact that the violently anti-Semitic 
National Socialist leadership had 
coopted the state's instruments of 
force, such as the army, the police, 
and the government, rendering re­
sistance futile at best. 
There is another explanation of 
German apathy, which neither Ben­
dersky nor Gordon considers: By vir­
tue of the difference of religion and 
ethnic origin, the jews were simply 
considered outside any possible Ger­
man universe of moral obligation. 
Hence, even among those who did 
not actively hate them, the fate of the 
jews was of little or no concern. 
There is overwhelming evidence that 
the Germans had one set of moral 
values for those they considered their 
racial kin, including the British and 
the Scandinavians, and an altogether 
different set for those they consid­
ered their racial inferiors. These in­
cluded the Poles, Russians, Gypsies, 
and, at the very bottom of the heap, 
the jews. 
The difference in attitude toward 
Germany's eastern neighbors was so 
great that one German writer, Joa­
chim Fest, refers to the war in the 
West as the Second World War and 
the war in the East as the Third. 
Hitler made no secret of the fact that 
he intended the war in the East to be 
a war of enslavement and extermina­
tion. He had been explicit about his 
plans in Mein Kampf and in his public 
addresses both before and after be­
coming Fiihrer. W hen Hitler an­
nounced to 250 of his leading gen­
erals in March 1941 that he would 
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shortly order the invasion of Russia 
and that none of the customary laws 
of warfare with regard to the taking 
of prisoners or behavior to the con­
quered population were to be ob­
served, not one general uttered a 
word of protest. Similarly, the first 
systematic extermination of the Jews 
was that conducted by the Einsatz­
griippen who entered Soviet territory 
with the invading German army in 
June 1941 and rounded up and exe­
cuted over 1, 500,000 Jews in mass 
graves during the summer campaign. 
Although totally in violation of his­
toric traditions concerning the con­
duct of war, this operation received 
the full, voluntary cooperation of the 
German army. In many instances, 
German soldiers joined in the killing 
operation with the approval of their 
commanders. Bendersky's assertion 
that most Germans dismissed ru­
mors of extermination as inconceiv­
able is contradicted by the evidence 
brought to light by Walter Laqueur in 
his book, The Terrible Secret, that the 
exterminations were widely known 
throughout Germany even when not 
officially acknowledged. 
Of course, there were a small num­
ber of Germans who not only op­
posed the racial policies but tried to 
help the Jews. Nevertheless, the 
number of Jews successfully extermi­
nated is the best evidence of the prac­
tical insignificance of these attitudes. 
Neither Bendersky nor Gordon 
raises what I believe to be the funda­
mental issue: Did the majority of the 
Germans regard the elimination of 
the Jews to be a benefit? There is 
overwhelming evidence that from 
the leaders of Germany's churches to 
the person in the street, there was a 
consensus that elimination was con­
sidered a benefit. Disagreement was 
only on the question of implementa­
tion. The Nazi elite understood that 
the majority of the Germans would 
not, before the fact, have chosen 
death camps and mass shootings as 
the methods of implementation. That 
is why the leadership went through 
the charade of pretending that they 
were keeping the operation a secret. 
In reality, the Nazi elite understood 
that if the Germans wanted to be rid 
of the Jews, extermination was the 
only viable method at the time. In 
6 
this respect, the Nazis were far more 
realistic than Germany's church lead­
ers. 
There was widespread consensus 
among the church leaders that the 
elimination of the Jews was a neces­
sary precondition for the creation of a 
homogenous Christian and Ger­
manic nation. As was so often the 
case among religious leaders, more 
thought was given by the church to 
the objective than to the question of 
implementation. The Nazi elite un­
derstood the primacy of the latter 
question and gave the Germans what 
they wanted, albeit using methods 
that most Germans would not have 
freely chosen. Nevertheless, once 
chosen, the methods elicited no pro­
test from the churches despite the 
Nazis' sensitivity to church opinion 
during the war. When church leaders 
protested against Nazi programs, as 
they did in the case of the so-called 
"euthanasia" project, Hitler changed 
course. No such protest was ever ut­
tered concerning the extermination 
of the Jews. Indeed, the Nazis gave 
the leaders what they wanted while 
freeing them of the unpleasant task 
of doing the dirty work themselves. 
Riclulrd L. Rubenstein is Robert 0. Lawton 
Distinguished Professor of Religion at the 
Florida State University in Tallalulssee. 
REJOINDER 
Joseph W. Bendersky 
Most of these responses serve a 
useful educational purpose in expos­
ing readers to various viewpoints. 
They make important contributions 
by elaboration of specific questions, 
especially regarding moral issues and 
religion, and require no reply. In­
deed, most, including those by such 
knowledgeable scholars as Feingold, 
Friedlander, and Roth, recognize the 
significance of Gordon's book. The 
pieces by Hirsch and Rubenstein, 
however, constitute gross distortions 
of my essay and an inexplicable mis­
understanding of Gordon's study. 
They also reflect limited knowledge 
of the historiography on Germany, as 
well as a dated, narrow view of Ger­
man history and society. 
Although Hirsch makes highly 
charged generalizations about my 
"peculiar vision of history" and "his­
torical determinism;' neither my in­
terpretations nor Gordon's are "pe­
c u l i a r" or s u g g e s t  h i s t o r i c a l  
determinism. The strength o f  her 
book is that it fits in so well with 
other significant scholarship, and I 
distinctly argue against ;nevitable 
events. This does not, however, in 
any way "imply;' as Hirsch sur­
mises, that historical processes are 
"irrelevant" or "there was no author­
itarianism or anti-Semitism in Ger­
man culture." On the contrary, Gor­
don and I clearly recognize cultural 
traditions, especially anti-Semitism, 
as exceptionally important. 
The problem starts "with Hirsch's 
inaccurate identification of a dichoto­
mous debate over whether the Holo­
caust was the result of Hitler's ability 
to seize power or tied to German 
historical developments. Neither 
Gordon nor I engage in such a de­
bate, since both points have a signifi­
cant interrelationship. "If we are ever 
to understand the extermination of 
European Jewry;' she writes, "we 
must study it within the complex mi­
lieu of German, as well as Jewish, 
history." 
It is the complexity of these devel­
opments that Hirsch ignores. Cer­
tainly, the Jewish Question, Nazism, 
and Hitler's Weltanschauung grew out 
of German history, but these are only 
one aspect of Germany's past. What 
Gordon argues against is the inaccu­
rate, one-dimensional picture of Ger-
man culture and history prevalent in 
much earlier literature of the "from 
Luther to Hitler" variety. By delving 
into German history to discover the 
"roots" of Nazism, such studies 
made important contributions in 
tracing racist and anti-Semitic trends. 
By concentrating on these currents to 
the exclusion of others, however, 
they created the false impression that 
these were the dominant characteris­
tics in Germany's heritage. The sub­
stantial. more recent literature Gor­
don cites establishes that Germany's 
cultural heritage was much more di­
verse. Significant competing intellec­
tual influences to anti-Semitism ex­
isted, represented by such prominent 
figures as Hegel. Humboldt, Mann, 
Weber, and others, and "the German 
liberal tradition, conservative opposi­
tion to rowdy anti-Semitism, Catholic 
humanitarianism, and socialist indif­
ference to purely racial issues." 
The historical questions regarding 
causation and responsibility for the 
"policy" of genocide are also miscon­
strued by Hirsch. Of course, geno­
cide was the "result of historical proc­
esses," but among these the Nazis, 
Hitler particularly, were the decisive 
factors. Without the Nazi seizure of 
power, which was not an inevitable 
result of German history or even 
likely before 1932-33, the Holocaust 
would never have occurred. The 
course of German history could have 
gone off in many different directions. 
Before the Nazi takeover, modern 
historical trends in Germany were 
not leading toward greater persecu­
tion, certainly not genocide, but indi­
cated greater acceptance, toleration, 
and assimilation. 
Moreover, in the Third Reich, 
Hitler personally did decide "policy" 
on matters of great magnitude. Many 
Nazi leaders and segments of the 
party agreed completely with his 
murderous plans; yet within this 
Fiihrerstaat Hitler remained the om­
nipotent decision-maker and paceset­
ter for major events, without whose 
determination to destroy European 
Jewry genocide would not have be­
come "policy." In demonstrating 
Hitler's central role in this policy, 
Gordon is not seeking to "absolve" 
others of responsibility. It is obvious 
to any scholar familiar with the his­
torical literature that what she chal­
lenges is the unfounded assertions of 
writers, such as David Irving, that 
either Hitler had nothing to do with 
the exterminations or this policy was 
originally initiated by subordinates. 
The evidence shows Hitler decided 
on the Final Solution and was the 
prime instigator of its fulfillment, 
though he had the enthusiastic sup­
port of many Nazis. Others, inside 
and outside the party, are not 
thereby absolved. I stated categori­
cally, "this by no means limits the 
guilt or responsibility to Hitler and 
the Nazis. Their policies could only 
have been instituted with the assist­
ance or acquiescence of others." As 
Roth noted, Gordon is quite critical of 
those who participated or "stood 
by." 
Hirsch not only ignores what I ac­
tually wrote, but his last paragraph in 
particular "oversimplifies complex 
events." The various reasons why 
different individuals, social sectors, 
and institutions participated or ac­
quiesced in the Holocaust, or en­
gaged in resistance, are analyzed ex­
tensively by Gordon. Her essential 
argument here is that individual re­
sistance could only save some while 
the mass murders could only have 
been stopped by destroying the Nazi 
state, a goal requiring organized in­
stitutional resistance. In a dictator­
ship with a system of terror that had 
either destroyed or Nazified most in­
stitutions, only those that retained 
organizational autonomy--churches 
and army--could have succeeded. 
Gordon and I hold them accountable 
for their complicity and inaction; we 
never even "imply" that "resistance 
was futile" or that they are to be 
excused because they were merely 
following orders. 
Rubenstein offers an equally sim­
plistic, inaccurate view, incorrectly 
assuming a homogeneity, as well as 
unity of outlook and purpose, that 
never existed among the Germans. 
He neglects the great diversity in val­
ues, beliefs, and politics deeply em­
bedded by religious, class, ideologi­
cal. and regional differences that kept 
this nation fragmented into antago­
nistic segments. His entire approach 
rests on the erroneous assumption of 
a "racist" identity among the Ger­
mans that the Nazis fostered, yet 
themselves knew they had not really 
achieved in the Third Reich. He actu­
ally uses the Nazi racial ideology to 
explain the values, outlooks, and re­
actions of all Germans, whereas in 
reality the diverse responses of Ger­
mans were determined by class, vari­
ous ideological perspectives, as well 
as economic and personal welfare. 
Apathy was displayed not only to­
ward the fate of the Jews, but also to 
that of many others in German soci­
ety. The middle classes, conserva­
tives, and churches lamented their 
own losses of rights but had no diffi­
culty accepting the suppression of 
the communists, Social Democrats, 
or trade unions. Likewise, were the 
communists and Social Democrats 
really so concerned about the plight 
of religious institutions? Even the 
anti-Nazi resistance was significantly 
hampered by class, ideological. and 
religious conflicts. 
There is no "overwhelming evi­
dence" for what Rubenstein con­
tends. He merely cites examples of 
how the "Nazi" racial ideology deter­
mined "Nazi" policies toward differ­
ent kinds of Europeans, while failing 
to distinguish Nazi racism from the 
varied outlooks of other Germans. 
For example, the Catholic and protes­
tant churches, with grass roots sup­
port, strongly opposed Nazi racial 
ideology. 
Rubenstein's loose interjection of 
the phrase "overwhelming evidence" 
is even more questionable in his con­
tention about a "consensus" (from 
church leaders to the average Ger­
man) that the "elimination" of the 
Jews was considered a benefit, but 
they only shied away from the logical 
necessity of implementing genocide. 
This false conjecture runs contrary to 
the evidence. A popular consensus 
about the necessity of elimination for 
some benefit did not exist; neither 
did the compatibility of goals be­
tween the churches and Nazis im­
plied by Rubenstein. Although the 
churches bear responsibility for their 
moral failure and silence, there is evi­
dence of their disapproval not only of 
genocide but also of Jewish persecu­
tion in the Third Reich in general. 
They failed to speak out primarily 
because of lack of courage and insti­
tutional self-interest. not because the 
N a z i s  g a v e  t h e m  "wh a t  t h e y  
wanted." 
Similarly, Walter Laqueur's The Ter­
rible Secret does not contradict the 
position that most Germans dismis­
sed rumors as inconceivable. While 
millions of Germans knew, according 
to Laqueur, they learned mostly from 
rumors, and "the number of people 
7 
in Germany who had a full picture 
was probably quite small," because 
the Nazis tried to keep genocide se­
cret rather than engage in a "cha­
rade" as Rubenstein alleges. Laqueur 
also draws an important distinction 
between "the meaning of 'to know' 
and 'to believe; " noting that many 
outside Germany, including Jews, 
had difficulty believing even after 
confronted with evidence. The event 
itself was difficult to grasp, especially 
when based on rumor and in light of 
the fallacious "atrocity stories" of 
World War I. Even when faced with 
facts, Laqueur writes, a tendency ex­
isted to avoid knowing or believing. 
Gordon's point is that the crucial 
question was not knowledge but 
what one was prepared to do about 
it. Here, Laqueur concurs with her 
thesis on apathy. He writes: "Very 
few people had an interest in the fate 
of the Jews. Most individuals faced a 
great many more important prob­
lems. It was an unpleasant topic, 
speculations were unprofitable, dis­
cussions of the fate of the Jews were 
discouraged. Consideration of this 
question was pushed aside, blotted 
out for the duration." 
Joseph W. Bendersky is professor of history at 
vcu. 
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